TO WHAT EXTENT CAN EDUCATION-FOCUSED INTERVENTIONS IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES EFFECTIVELY REDUCE CHILD LABOR RATES COMPARED TO THE MINIMUM AGE CONVENTION AND THE MICROCREDIT PROGRAMS?
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.63034/esr-523Keywords:
child labor, education-focused programs, Cash Transfers for Education, School Feeding Program, educational access, children, developing countriesAbstract
Child labor is a major problem among the various challenges facing developing countries. Despite the variety of efforts and strategies by numerous organizations to combat child labor, the problem persists unabated. The persistence of the problem is further intensified by underlying factors such as poverty and limited educational access. The purpose of this study is to assess the effectiveness of education-centered programs compared to conventional interventions such as the Minimum Age Convention and Microcredit Programs in reducing child labor rates. The study was conducted through extensive secondary research and analysis of scholarly works. The findings revealed that the Minimum Age Convention faces challenges primarily related to enforcement and Microcredit Programs encounter effectiveness issues and may exacerbate the problem of child labor. In contrast, education-focused initiatives such as Cash Transfers for Education (LCT, CCT) and School Feeding Programs have been demonstrated to effectively reduce child labor by incentivizing school attendance. Despite criticisms regarding cost and the overall efficacy of these education-focused programs, extensive research suggested tangible benefits from these interventions. In conclusion, the study underscores the critical role of education-centered approaches in reducing child labor rates in developing countries, advocating for further analysis and support for these impactful strategies.
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